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NANCY A. COMBS, UCHEORA 0. ONWUAMAEGBU, MARK B. REES, AND
JACQUELINE WEIS MAN*
This article reviews and summarizes significant developments in 2003 concerning inter-
national courts and tribunals, particularly events relating to the International Court of
Justice, the United Nations Compensation Commission, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
and the Claims Resolution Tribunal. Other articles in this issue detail significant develop-
ments relating to the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the proposed additional ad hoc international crim-
inal tribunals, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the World Trade Orga-
nization dispute settlement system, and other trade dispute settlement systems.
I. International Court of Justice'
The International Court of Justice (the Court or ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations (U.N.). The ICJ's jurisdiction is two-fold: (1) to deliver judgments in
contentious cases submitted to it by sovereign states; and (2) to issue non-binding advisory
opinions at the request of certain U.N. organs and agencies. At the close of 2003, the ICJ's
fifty-seventh year since its inaugural sitting on April 18, 1946, twenty-one contentious cases
and one request for an advisory opinion were pending. The Court delivered its judgment
in three cases, ruled on two requests for the indication of provisional measures, and issued
numerous other orders in the nature of specific case management. Three new contentious
cases and the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion were docketed in 2003.2
*The authors are leaders of the ABA International Courts Committee. Nancy A. Combs and Mark B. Rees
co-chair the committee. Ms. Combs is a Legal Adviser at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, The Hague, Neth-
erlands. Mr. Rees is an Attorney in the Office of the General Counsel of the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission in Washington, D.C. Ucheora 0. Onwuarnaegbu and Jacqueline Weisman are the committee's co-
vice chairs. Mr. Onwuamaegbu is a Senior Counsel at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
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1. All International Court of Justice decisions, pleadings, and other documents cited in this section are
available at the Court's website: http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited May 16, 2004).
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This section reports briefly on each of these activities as well as the Court's year-end
composition.
A. CoNTrrTIous CASES DURING 2003
1. Oil Platforms (Iran v. US.)
On November 6, 2003, the Court rejected on the merits competing claims for reparations
by Iran and the United States under the parties' 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
and Consular Rights (Treaty), and in the process found that the use of force by the United
States was contrary to international law. Iran initiated the case in 1992 based on the attack
and destruction of certain Iranian oil platforms by U.S. warships in 1987 and 1988. Two
shipping incidents were a focal point of the case. First, a Kuwaiti tanker named the Sea Isle
City, re-flagged to the United States, was struck by a missile near Kuwait Harbor on Oc-
tober 16, 1987. The United States attributed the attack to Iran and three days later, claiming
to act in self-defense, launched an attack against the Iranian offshore oil production com-
plexes of Reshadat and Resalat, destroying certain platforms. Second, on April 14, 1988,
the USS Samuel B. Roberts (Roberts) was struck by a mine in international waters near
Bahrain while returning from an escort mission. Asserting the right of self-defense, the
United States attacked and destroyed the Iranian oil complexes of Nasr and Salman on
April 18, 1988.
4
Iran claimed that the attacks were in breach of article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty.5 The
United States denied any violation of that article's terms and further claimed that its actions
were justified under article XX, paragraph 1(d) of the Treaty and thus could not be deemed
a violation of the Treaty.6 In its counterclaim, the United States asserted that Iran was in
breach of article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty "in attacking vessels in the Gulf with mines
and missiles and otherwise engaging in military actions that were dangerous and detrimental
to commerce and navigation between the territories of the United States and the Islamic
Republic of Iran."7 Iran denied responsibility for the alleged attacks and further claimed
2. In addition, two cases were discontinued with prejudice and removed from the Court's list at the joint
request of the parties. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.) (Libya v. U.S.), 2003 I.CJ. Nos. 88, 89 (Orders of Sept.
10).
3. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.CJ. No. 90 (Nov. 6), 125. The votes respecting the reparations
claims were fourteen to two and fifteen to one, respectively. The rationale for deciding Iran's claim generated
more controversy than the fourteen to two vote on the dispostifwould suggest, however. See, e.g., Separate
Opinions of Judges Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, and Owada (rejecting Court's consid-
eration or treatment of the issue of legality of the use of force by the United States). The Court's decision is
summarized below. Eleven judges appended declarations, separate opinions, or dissents to the judgment.
4. Id. T 25. In its report to the Security Council at the time, the United States stated that each shipping
incident was the latest in a series of offensive attacks and provocations by Iranian naval forces and that the
response of the United States was directed at legitimate military targets. Id. TT 48, 67.
5. The text reads as follows: "Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be
freedom of commerce and navigation." Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15,
1955, U.S.-Iran, art. X, § 1, 8 U.S.T. 899, available at http://www.parstimes.com/law/iran-us-treaty.htnn
(last visited May 16, 2004).
6. Under this provision, the Treaty "shall not preclude the application of [certain] measures," including
those "necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests." Id. art. XX, § 1.
7. Oil Pladirms (Iran v. U.S.), 26.
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that its naval operations in the Persian Gulf throughout this period were purely defensive
in nature.
To uphold Iran's claim, the Court noted that it would have to be proved that the attacks
on the oil platforms infringed article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and, further, that such
attacks were not justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of
the United States under article XX, paragraph 1(d). The Court found factors militating in
favor of considering the latter issue first, stating that the original dispute concerned the
legality of the use of force by the United States, and the parties had ascribed the topic
importance during litigation. The Court then found, insofar as article XX, paragraph 1(d)
is invoked to justify the use of armed force in self-defense, the proper interpretation of the
article requires applying the conditions for self-defense under the relevant rules of inter-
national law, i.e., the U.N. Charter and customary law. As a result, the Court determined
that the jurisdiction conferred by article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty (to decide any
question of interpretation or application of the Treaty) applied to the contested actions
considered in light of the provisions of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.8
The Court thus proceeded to determine whether the United States could rely on article
XX, paragraph 1(d) as a defense to Iran's claim under article X, paragraph 1. The Court
stated that in order to prove it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in the
exercise of the individual right of self-defense, the United States had to show that Iran was
responsible for the attacks on the United States; "that those attacks were of such a nature
as to be qualified as armed attacks within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, and as understood in customary law"; that the responses were "necessary
and proportional to the armed attack made on [the United States]"; and "that the platforms
were a legitimate military target."9
Upon consideration of the record, the Court found the United States failed to demon-
strate Iranian responsibility for the missile attack on the Sea Isle City.'0 The Court further
stated that the attack on the Sea Isle City, and other attacks alleged by the United States
to have preceded the Sea Isle City attack, even taken cumulatively, did not seem to constitute
an armed attack on the United States." With respect to the mining of the Roberts, the
Court found the evidence of Iranian responsibility "highly suggestive, but not conclusive"
and stated that, in view of all the circumstances, it was unable to hold that the attacks on
the Salman and Nasr platforms were justifiably made in response to an "armed attack" on
the United States by IranY
The Court found that the attacks on the oil platforms in 1987 and 1988, respectively,
did not satisfy the requirement of necessity as responses to the attack on the Sea Isle City
and the mining of the Roberts. 3 With respect to the requirement of proportionality, the
Court stated that the 1987 attack on oil platforms might have been considered proportion-
ate had it been necessary as a response to the missile incident as an armed attack carried
out by Iran.' 4 The 1988 attacks, on the other hand, were part of a more extensive military
8. Id. 9T 35-42.





14. Id. 9] 77.
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operation. In the Court's view, neither the operation as a whole, nor that part of it that
destroyed the Salman and Nasr platforms were a proportionate use of force in self-defense."
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the U.S. actions against Iranian oil installations on
October 19, 1987 and April 18, 1988, were not justified under international law and thus
did not fall within the category of measures contemplated by article XX, paragraph 1 (d) of
the Treaty. 6
Turning to the question of whether the oil platform attacks infringed on the freedom of
commerce between the territories of Iran and the United States, as guaranteed by article
X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the Court studied the effects of the attacks on oil exports
from Iran to the United States. The Court underlined that the commercial activity pro-
tected by this article needs to occur between the territories of the parties to the Treaty. The
Court found that the 1987 attacks were directed against oil platforms undergoing repair,
and consequently these platforms were not involved in commerce between Iran and the
United States. 7 Thus, these attacks did not infringe the rights of Iran under article X,
paragraph 1.18 Regarding the 1988 attacks on Iranian oil platforms, the Court noted that
they occurred after the issuance of U.S. Executive Order 12613, which imposed an embargo
on, inter alia, Iranian crude oil.' 9 Accordingly, the Court held that the effect of these attacks
was not to infringe on the freedom of commerce between Iran and the United States.20
The Court also found that transactions involving intermediaries, through whom petroleum
products derived from Iranian crude oil reached the United States during the embargo, did
not amount to commerce between Iran and the United States.2' In conclusion, the Court
found that it could not uphold the submissions of Iran and, as a result, rejected the Iranian
claim for reparations.
The final issue concerned the counterclaim of the United States for reparations. Having
disposed of Iranian objections to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the counterclaim and
to its admissibility," the Court stated that in order for the counterclaim to succeed, the
United States had to show that its freedom of commerce or navigation was impaired and
that the impairing acts were attributable to Iran.23
The Court proceeded to examine each of the alleged Iranian attacks, recalling that U.S.
vessels allegedly attacked by Iran are covered by article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty only
if they were engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of the United States
and Iran.14 The Court concluded that "none of the vessels described by the United States
as being damaged by Iran's alleged attacks was engaged in commerce or navigation" between
the territories of Iran and the United States." Noting that the United States had also
presented its claim in a generic sense (essentially claiming that Iran's cumulative conduct
had made the Gulf unsafe in violation of article X), the Court stated that the United States
15. Id.
16. Id. T 78.
17. Id. 192.
18. Id. T 98.
19. Id. T 94.
20. Id. 98.
21. Id. 9 96-97.
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still had to show that there was an actual impediment to commerce or navigation between
the two states. Because it had not, and the Court's findings regarding the specific alleged
incidents revealed no interference with commerce or navigation under the Treaty, the Court
rejected the generic claim as well.26 The Court thus concluded that there had not been a
violation of the Treaty and found it unnecessary to reach the separate contested issue of
attributing the various alleged incidents to Iran.2 7 Therefore, the Court rejected the coun-
terclaim of the United States for reparations."
2. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Yugoslavia v.
BoSn. & Herz), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosn. & Herz)
Pursuant to article 61 of the Statute of the Court, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) sought revision of the Court's 1996 judgment on preliminary objections in an on-
going case involving claims of the violation of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). In the disputed judgment,
the Court ruled that the compromissory clause (article IX) of the Genocide Convention,
to which the Court found both parties were bound, conferred jurisdiction on the Court
and that the case was admissible. In its application for revision, FRY took the position that
its admission to the U.N. in 2000 was a new fact that proved that it was not a member of
the U.N., a party to the Statute of the Court or a party to the Genocide Convention at any
time prior to the 1996 judgment, and therefore the Court lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute. 9
The Court rejected the application for revision on February 3, 2003.30 The Court held
that the sort of fact required to trigger article 61 revision considerations is a fact that existed
at the time of the disputed judgment, yet went undiscovered.3' The fact that FRY was
admitted to the U.N. by the General Assembly more than four years after the 1996 judg-
ment did not constitute such a fact. 2 The Court further noted that at the time of the 1996
judgment, the parties and the Court were aware that General Assembly resolution 47/1
required FRY to submit a request for admission to the U.N. rather than accepting any claim
of automatic succession to the membership of the former Yugoslavia. The Court stated that
resolution 47/1 did not affect FRY's right to appear before the Court, its right to be party
to a dispute before the Court under the Statute, or its position in relation to the Genocide
Convention.3 The Court also stated that General Assembly resolution 55/12-the General
Assembly's decision to admit FRY to membership in 2000-"cannot have changed retro-
26. Id. 9 123.
27. Id.
28. Id. 9 124.
29. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia),
Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosn. & Herz.), 2003 I.C.J. No. 122 (Feb. 3) $ 7. FRY refined its theory
at oral argument, contending that the new facts upon which the application for revision was based were its not
being a party to the Court's Statute or to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, facts it contended were not
revealed until its admission to U.N. membership in 2000. Id. 19 19-20.
30. Id. 75. The vote was ten to three. Two of the ten judges in favor appended separate opinions. The
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actively" FRY's status before the U.N. or FRY's position in relation to the Court's Statute
or the Genocide Convention.3 4 The Court concluded that no facts within the meaning of
article 61 had been discovered since 1996, which was one of the conditions for admissibility
of an application under article 61. Thus, the Court found the application inadmissible and
declined to analyze whether it otherwise satisfied the conditions for demonstrating admis-
sibility under article 61."
3. Application for Revision of the J7udgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal/Hond.: Nicar. intervening)
(El Sal. v. Hond.)
El Salvador's application under article 61 of the statute, requesting revision of one aspect
of a 1992 judgment that decided certain boundary disputes between the parties, met a
similar fate as that of FRY, albeit on different grounds. The Chamber that was formed to
adjudicate the application found it inadmissible on December 18, 2003, on the basis that
the alleged new facts did not amount to "decisive factors" within the meaning of article
61.36 El Salvador previously claimed in the underlying dispute that the boundary in the
sixth sector should follow an old course of the Goascorin River, which had been abandoned
through a process of avulsion prior to independence in 1821. El Salvador contended that
avulsion would not bring about a change in the boundary; instead, the boundary would
continue to follow the old channel under Spanish colonial law and international law. In its
application for revision, El Salvador contended that decisive factors in the rejection of its
boundary claim included: (1) the absence of evidence of an abrupt alteration of the river
during the colonial period; and (2) a chart and a report of the expedition of the brigantine
El Activo in 1794 offered by Honduras." El Salvador alleged that newly discovered evi-
dence, unavailable to it at the time of the 1992 judgment, demonstrated the original riverbed
and its abrupt alteration around 1762, as well as the unreliability of the version of the chart
and descriptive report upon which the 1992 judgment rested.
The Chamber found that El Salvador's alleged new facts, which included expert reports
from 2002 and different versions of the chart and expedition report from those proffered
in the original proceeding, provided no basis for calling into question the decision made
by the Chamber in 1992. Specifically, the Chamber stated that the 1992 Chamber had
rejected El Salvador's claim that the boundary in 1821 did not follow the course of the river
at that date, but did so based on El Salvador's conduct during the 19th century rather than
on a rejection of the avulsion theory espoused by El Salvador.3" Thus, the Chamber held
that, even if avulsion were proved and its legal consequences were those proposed by El
34. Id. 71.
35. Id. 73. The opinion identifies five conditions for admissibility under article 61 of the Statute: (a) the
application should be based upon the 'discovery' of a 'fact'; (b) the fact, the discovery of which is relied on,
must be 'of such a nature as to be a decisive factor'; (c) the fact should have been 'unknown' to the Court and
to the party claiming revision when the judgment was given; (d) ignorance of this fact must not be 'due to
negligence'; and (e) the application for revision must be 'made at latest within six months of the discovery of
the new fact' and before ten years have elapsed from the date of the judgment. Id. 1 16.
36. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening) (El Sal. v. Hond.) 2003 I.CJ. (Dec. 18).
The vote was four to one.
37. Id. 26, 41.
38. Id. 40.
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Salvador, the facts asserted were not decisive factors regarding the challenged judgment. 9
With respect to the chart and expedition report, whose credibility El Salvador disputed,
the Chamber found that the versions presented by El Salvador did not differ in material
respects from those introduced in connection with the original proceeding and relied upon
by the Chamber in reaching its 1992 judgment.4" Indeed, the Chamber found that the newly
offered documents supported the conclusions arrived at by the Chamber in 1992.41 Ac-
cordingly, the Chamber ruled that these facts were not decisive factors in the 1992 judg-
ment.42 The Chamber found the application inadmissible upon its failure to adequately
satisfy all conditions of article 61 revision procedure, and declined to consider whether El
Salvador's application satisfied the other conditions of article 61.41
4. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.)
OnJune 17, 2003, the Court rejected a request for the indication of a provisional measure
submitted by Congo in its 2002 application against France."4 Congo's application sought
the annulment of the investigation and prosecution measures taken by French judicial au-
thorities in connection with a 2001 complaint filed on behalf of certain human rights or-
ganizations. The complaint alleged crimes against humanity and torture committed in the
Congo against individuals of Congolese nationality by Congolese officials, including the
President, Minister of the Interior, Inspector-General of the Congolese Armed Forces, and
Commander of the Presidential Guard. 45 Congo's claims against the French judicial activity
were two-fold. First, Congo claimed that France was violating international law in its pur-
ported exercise of universal jurisdiction under the circumstances. Second, Congo claimed
that France was violating the international customary rule granting criminal immunity to
a foreign head of state."
In its application, Congo proposed to base jurisdiction, as contemplated by article 38,
paragraph 5 of the Rules of the Court, on France's then yet-to-be-given consent.47 This
provision creates a vehicle for one party to invite acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction for
purposes of the specific dispute; the case is not docketed and will not commence unless and
until the defending party consents to jurisdiction. For the first time in the provision's
application, the defending party consented to jurisdiction,4 opening the door for the
Court's prompt consideration of the requested interim relief.
Congo requested an interim order from the ICJ for the "immediate suspension" of pro-
ceedings being conducted by the French investigating judge. 49 France argued, inter alia,
39. Id.
40. Id. 52.
41. Id. 91 53-54.
42. Id. 55.
43. Id. T 59.
44. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.CJ. No. 129 (Apr. 11), 1 41. The vote
was fourteen to one.
45. Id. 110.
46. Id. 1 23.
47. Id. 121.
48. France's acceptance prompted ICJ President Jiuyong to remark later that, "since France was free to
disregard the application, the fact that it chose to accept jurisdiction, to appear and defend the case, is an
encouraging tribute to the value of judicial proceedings as a means of pacific settlement of disputes." H.E.
Judge Shi Jiuyong, President of the International Court of Justice, Speech to the General Assembly of the
United Nations (October 31, 2003).
49. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. No. 129 (Apr. 11), 1 24.
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that French law embodies the principle of immunity of foreign heads of state, that all steps
taken by the French courts were strictly in conformity with French law, and that those
courts had respected the limits of their jurisdiction."° On the facts presented, which included
France's representation that a judicial request for the written deposition of Congo's Pres-
ident had been retained by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Court found that
Congo had not demonstrated the risk of irreparable prejudice required to warrant indicating
provisional measures.5' The Court also noted its power to indicate provisional measures in
appropriate circumstances to prevent the aggravation or extension of a dispute, but did not
find such circumstances here.52
5. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)
Mexico filed an application on January 9, 2003, alleging that fifty-four Mexican nationals
have been sentenced to death in the states of California, Texas, Illinois, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon for criminal convictions in violation of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention).51 Mexico claims that, pur-
suant to article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the United States is under an international
legal obligation to ensure that Mexico can communicate with and assist an arrested national
prior to trial. Mexico further claims that, by failing to comply with the notification provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention in each instance, the United States has prevented Mexico
from exercising its right to carry out consular functions contemplated by the Vienna Con-
vention, thereby injuring Mexico as a state entity, and its nationals.54
Mexico concurrently filed a request for the indication of provisional measures. Mexico
asked the Court to order the United States to: take all measures necessary to ensure against
the setting of an execution date or the execution of any Mexican national; submit a com-
pliance report to the Court; and guarantee that no action is taken that might prejudice the
rights of Mexico or its nationals pending the Court's resolution of the case on the merits.55
The United States responded that, following the Court's judgment in LaGrand, it had put
in place a vast program to ensure compliance with the notification obligation under article
36 of the Vienna Convention, and that it had also taken measures to ensure review and
reconsideration in all death penalty cases in which the obligation had been breached.56 The
United States contended that Mexico's request was not consistent with the LaGrand judg-
ment, that the request was too sweeping and would prejudice its sovereign right to operate
50. Id. 33.
51. Id. J 31, 35, 37-38.
52. Id. 39.
53. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.CJ. (Jan. 9), 9. 1-2.
54. Id. $T 272, 280. Mexico contends that the legal issues are largely controlled by the Court's decision in
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.CJ. No. 104 (Oct. 23), whose holding on the issue of remedy it paraphrased
as follows:
If the receiving State fails to comply with Article 36, and the sending State's national has been subjected
to 'prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties', . . . the receiving State must
'allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation
of the rights set forth in the Convention'....
Id. 18, quoting LaGrand 125.
55. Id. T 18.
56. Id. T 30, 36. On the latter point, the United States stated: "[C]lemency proceedings provide a flexible
process that is best suited for achieving, without procedural obstacles, the review and reconsideration this Court
called for" in LaGrand. Id. 37.
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its criminal justice system, and that the requirements of irreparable prejudice and urgency
for the indication of provisional measures were not established. 7
The Court found that three of the fifty-four Mexican nationals were at risk of execution
in the coming weeks and their execution would cause irreparable prejudice to any rights
the Court might ultimately determine belong to Mexico.58 Accordingly, the Court unani-
mously ordered the United States to take all measures necessary to ensure the three indi-
viduals were not executed pending final judgment 9
B. NEW CASES OR ADVISORY OPINION REQUESTS DURING 2003
1. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)
Mexico's application and the Court's granting in part of its request for the indication of
a provisional measure are discussed above.
2. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr)
Congo's application and the Court's denial of its request for the indication of a provi-
sional measure are discussed above.
3. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malay./Sing.)
On July 24, 2003, Malaysia and Singapore submitted a boundary dispute for the Court's
adjudication by special agreement. They requested the Court's binding determination on
whether sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge
belonged to Malaysia or Singapore. In their special agreement, the parties also proposed
the procedure they wished to follow in the conduct of the proceedings.
6 °
4. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Request for Advisory Opinion)
In a letter dated December 8, 2003, from the U.N. Secretary-General to the President
of the Court, the General Assembly requested that the Court urgently render an advisory
opinion on the following question.
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel,
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and prin-
ciples of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?61
57. Id. T 29, 31-32, 36.
58. Id. T 55.
59. Id. 59. The Court further ordered the United States to inform it of all measures taken to implement
its order. The Court also indicated that further provisional relief could be warranted if the status of the other
fifty-one individuals on death row referred to in the application were to change prior to the Court's judgment
on the merits. Id. T9 56, 59.
60. Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court ofJustice of the Dispute between Malaysia
and Singapore concerning Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge,
2003 I.CJ. No. 130 (Feb. 6).
61. Request for Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2003 .CJ. No. 131 (Order of Dec. 19), para. 2.
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The request for the advisory opinion was set out in General Assembly resolution A/RES/
ES-10/14, adopted on December 8, 2003, at the 23rd Meeting of the Resumed Tenth
Emergency Special Session, with ninety votes in favor, eight against, and seventy-four ab-
stentions. The report of the Secretary-General (A/ES-10/248) referenced in the question
to the Court was submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to General Assembly reso-
lution A/RES/ES-10/13 of October 21, 2003. In paragraph 1 of that resolution, the General
Assembly demanded that Israel "stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory" and, in paragraph 3 of the same resolution, the General As-
sembly requested the Secretary-General to report periodically on compliance with the res-
olution.62 The Secretary-General's report concluded that Israel was not in compliance with
the General Assembly's demand. Annexed to report A/ES-10/248 are summaries of the
legal positions of the Government of Israel and of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
respectively.
The Secretary-General's December 8 letter indicated that materials for submission to
the Court were being prepared pursuant to article 65 of the Statute of the Court and would
be submitted to the Court as soon as possible. 63
C. GENERAL LIST
As of December 31, 2003, the General List of ICJ cases was composed of the following:
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.);
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo); Legality of the Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v.
Belg.), (Serb. & Mont. v. Can.), (Serb. & Mont. v. Fr.), (Serb. & Mont. v. ER.G.), (Serb.
& Mont. v. Italy), (Serb. & Mont. v. Neth.), (Serb. & Mont. v. Port.), (Serb. & Mont. v.
U.K.); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda); Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v.
Serb. & Mont.); Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.); Certain Property (Liech. v. ER.G.); Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicar. v. Colom.); Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger); Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda); Avena and Other Mexican Na-
tionals (Mex. v. U.S.); Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.); Sovereignty
over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay./Sing.); and
Request for Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory."
D. COMPosITIoN OF THE COURT
As of December 31, 2003, the Court was composed as follows: Shi Jiuyong (China),
President; Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar), Vice-President; Gilbert Guillaume (France);
62. G.A. Res. ES-10/13, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Spec. Sess., 23rd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
ES-10/13 (2003).
63. The Court issued a procedural order in the case on December 19, 2003 that fixed the time limit for the
filing of written statements at January 30, 2003, and scheduled the hearing to open on February 23, 2004.
Request for Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2003 I.C.J. No. 131 (Order of Dec. 19).
64. Current docket of the Court, International Court of Justice, available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last
visited May 16, 2004).
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Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone); Vladlen S. Vereshchetin (Russian Federation); Rosalyn
Higgins (United Kingdom); Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren (Venezuala); Pieter H. Kooijmans
(Netherlands); Francisco Rezek (Brazil); Awn Shawkat AI-Khasawneh (Jordan); Thomas
Buergenthal (United States); Nabil Elaraby (Egypt); Hisahi Owada (Japan); Bruno Simma
(Germany); and Peter Tomka (Slovakia). Judges Jiuyong and Ranjeva were elected to their
respective leadership positions for three-year terms in February 2003. In the same month,
the judges elected members of the Court's Chamber of Summary Procedure, Chamber for
Environmental Matters, and the Court's various committees.61
II. United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), a subsidiary organ of the
United Nations Security Council, was established by the Security Council at the end of the
first Gulf War in 1991 to pay compensation to foreign governments, nationals, and cor-
porations for "any direct loss, damage,... or injury... as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait. "66 Under its long established work program, the processing of
claims by several of the Commission's panels of Commissioners was concluded in 2003.
Work of the "D" Panels continued and is expected to conclude in 2004. Other panels,
including the Palestinian Claims Panel and the Panel for Overlapping ("E4") claims, con-
tinued work that arose well after the work program was put in place. Other work of the
Commission, including payment of awards and archiving, is expected to continue for some
time. It is unclear what effect any agreement by governments to forgive Iraq's debts, fol-
lowing the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, will have on the remaining work of the
Commission. One immediate effect on the Commission has been the reduction of the
amount that is made available for compensation to successful claimants as a result of
the recent events in that country.67
Previously, funds were made available to the Compensation Fund from the proceeds of
the "oil-for-food" mechanism established by Security Council Resolution 986 (1995) and
subsequent resolutions. The revenue derived from the oil sales authorized by resolution
986 (1995) was deposited in a specially created UN escrow account. The funds in the escrow
account were used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and to provide
income into the Compensation Fund. The exact amount entering the Compensation Fund
each month depends on the quantity of oil sold by Iraq and the price of oil; however, prior
to Security Council Resolution 1483, the fund received 2 5 percent of the proceeds of such
sales, which was a reduction from the 30 percent rate when the Fund was established.
Following the passing of Security Council resolution 14836s on May 22, 2003, which
provides that the Compensation Fund shall receive 5 percent of all export sales of petro-
leum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq, the UNCC Governing Council at its
forty-eighth session in June 2003, adopted Decision 197, establishing a temporary payment
65. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, The judges of the International Court ofJustice elect
members of the Court's Chambers and Committees, 2003/11 (Feb. 11, 2003).
66. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). For an
overview of the structure and jurisdiction of the UNCC, see the UNCC website: http://www.unog.ch/uncc
(last visited May 16, 2004).
67. Funds to pay the awards of compensation are drawn from the United Nations Compensation Fund, as
are funds to meet the operating costs of the Commission.
68. Pursuant to the same resolution, sanctions imposed against Iraq under resolution 661 (1990) were lifted.
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mechanism in light of the reduction in the Fund's income. Under this temporary mecha-
nism, $200 million from the Compensation Fund will be made available for the pay-
ment of claims every quarter. Successful claimants in all categories will receive an initial
amount of the lesser of $100,000 or the unpaid principal amount of the award, with the
disbursement of subsequent rounds of payments of $100,000 to successful claimants in all
categories in the order in which they have been approved, until the available funds for
distribution are exhausted. Another significant development in 2003 was the decision by
the Governing Council to allocate an amount not exceeding $5 million to continue fimding
the provision of technical assistance to Iraq in the review of "F4" environmental claims
under the terms of its decision 124 of 2002.
A. PAYMENT OF UNCC AwARDs
The UNCC makes funds available to governments or international organizations that
originally submitted claims and who are then responsible for both the distribution of com-
pensation to successful claimants within six months of receiving payment and reporting on
payments made to the claimants no later than three months thereafter. The payment re-
ports, which describe the mechanisms for the making of payments to claimants and detail
the amount and date of payment, enable the Commission to monitor the distribution of
compensation. Funds that are not distributed to claimants are to be returned to the
Commission.
In June 2003 the Governing Council, while considering the transparency of the distri-
bution process of funds to successful claimants, decided that for future payments, govern-
ments should also be required to provide audit certificates to accompany reports on the
distribution of payments to successful claimants.
The awards approved by the Governing Council at the end of its fiftieth session on
December 18, 2003, brought the total compensation awarded by the Commission to date
to over $48 billion, with approximately $18 billion of that amount having been made avail-
able to governments and international organizations for distribution to successful claimants
in all categories of claims.
B. GOVERNING COUNCIL DECISIONS
1. Forty-Seventh Session
At the first session of the Council in 2003, the Council approved four reports and rec-
ommendations of the panels of Commissioners concerning 286 claims of individuals and
223 claims of corporations. Compensation was awarded to 258 of the individual claimants
and ninety-six corporate claimants. The total amount of compensation approved by the
Council to these claimants was approximately $223.2 million.
2. Forty-Eighth Session
During its second session of the year, the Council approved nine reports and recom-
mendations of the panels of Commissioners concerning claims from individuals in category
"D," claims from corporations in category "E," and claims from a Government in category
"E" Compensation in the sum of $2.27 billion was recommended for 1048 of the 1276
claims covered by those reports.
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3. Forty-Ninth Session
In this session, the Council approved seven reports and recommendations of the panels
of Commissioners concerning claims from individuals in category "D" and claims from
corporations in category "E." The Council approved compensation in the sum of
$195,717,734 for 687 category "D" claims and $119,395,351 was recommended for 346
corporate claims in categories "El," "E2," and "E4."
4. Fiftieth Session
In its final session of the year, the Council approved a total compensation of about $1.4
billion for successful claims in six reports and recommendations of the panels of Commis-
sioners concerning claims from individuals in category "D," claims from corporations in
category "E," and claims from Governments in category "E"
The Report and Recommendations (Report) made by the Panel of Commissioners con-
cerning the First Installment of Palestinian "late claims" for damages up to $100,000 (cate-
gory "C" claims) (S/AC.26/2003/26) was also approved.69 The Report covered 1,691 claims
out of which the Panel of Commissioners determined that 883 satisfied the threshold eli-
gibility requirement for review, namely whether the claimant had a full and effective op-
portunity to file their claim, as set out by the Governing Council. Of these 883 eligible
claims, 852 were recommended for compensation, with the total award valued at
$15,768,454. The Report also covered the Panel's eligibility assessment in respect of 70
category "D" Palestinian late claims.
The Report included the threshold eligibility assessment directed by the Governing
Council in respect to all Palestinian late claims, requiring the Panel to determine whether
claimants have demonstrated that they did not have a full and effective opportunity to file
claims during the regular filing period. The Report also reviewed the merits of the category
"C" claims that satisfied the threshold eligibility requirement. The category "D" claims
that satisfied the threshold eligibility requirement were deferred for review separately by
the two category "D" Panels of Commissioners.
The Panel used these claims, together with other sample claims, as a pilot group to
elaborate guidelines for the threshold eligibility assessment of all Palestinian late claims.
Only those claims that the Panel determines satisfy the threshold eligibility requirement
will be considered on their merits. The Panel has also used the category "C" claims in the
pilot group to determine whether modifications to the established methodologies for cate-
gory "C" claims are required to take into account the unique or specific characteristics of
category "C" Palestinian late claims.
The Panel developed a two-step process for conducting the threshold eligibility assess-
ment and elaborated guidelines for the assessment of whether claimants had a full and
effective opportunity to file claims during the regular filing period. The first step in the
69. At its forty-second session on December 11-13, 2001, the Governing Council established a late claims
program for Palestinians who can demonstrate that they did not have a full and effective opportunity to file
claims with the UNCC during the Commission's filing period for individual claims from January 1, 1992 to
January 1, 1996. At its forty-fourth session on June 18, 2002, the Governing Council extended the deadline
for the Commission's receipt of Palestinian late claims from July 1 to September 30, 2002. A total of 46,160
claims were filed by the Palestinian Authority under the late claims program, 43,806 claims in category "C"
and 2,354 claims in category "D," as well as a few claims were filed in categories "A" and "B," which are to
be processed as category "C" claims.
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eligibility assessment consists of identifying the claims filed under the late claims program
by claimants who had previously filed claims during the regular filing period. The Panel
identified over 4,000 confirmed matches. The Panel concluded that the existence of a pre-
viously filed claim in another claim category could, but did not necessarily, indicate that
the claimant had a full and effective opportunity to file a claim with the Commission during
the regular filing period. Because in certain circumstances, claim forms for particular claim
categories were not available during the regular filing period, claimants had the ability to
file claims in some claim categories but not in others. Such cases were, therefore, considered
on a case-by-case basis to determine their eligibility to participate in the project.
For claims found to be eligible on the basis of matching, the second step included re-
viewing the reasons proffered by each claimant as to why he or she failed to file a claim
during the regular filing period. The Panel's starting premise was that only stateless Pales-
tinians are eligible to participate in the late-claims program. In determining whether a
stateless Palestinian claimant had a full and effective opportunity to file claims with the
Commission during the regular filing period, the Panel considered the particular circum-
stances of each claimant, the efforts made by the claimant to file a claim during the regular
filing period, and the explanation provided by the claimant as to why he or she was unable
to do so. The Panel required each claimant to submit a reasons statement with the claim
form describing his or her circumstances during the regular filing period and an explanation
as to why he or she alleges the lack of a full and effective opportunity to file claims during
that period. The Panel also required each claimant to submit documentation to support
the assertions contained in the reasons statement. The Panel concluded that claimants who
failed to provide a reasons statement with their claim form failed to meet their burden of
demonstrating the lack of a full and effective opportunity to file claims during the regular
filing period and were, therefore, ineligible to participate in the late claims program.
In processing the eligible claims, the Panel adopted the legal framework and general
issues relating to the processing of category "C" claims previously established by the cate-
gory "C" Panel of Commissioners; in particular its final report, the "Report and recom-
mendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the seventh installment of
individual claims for damages up to $100,000 (category 'C' claims)," which provides the
most comprehensive discussion by the category "C" Panel of the processing of category
"C" claims submitted during the regular filing period. The Panel, however, made modifi-
cations to the "C" methodology to take into account the possible advantage that claimants
in the late claims program may have had over claimants that did not have the advantage of
knowing the methodology contained in the "C" reports.
With regard to category "D" claims, the Panel determined that forty-seven, with a total
claimed amount of $229,233,760.30, were eligible for inclusion in the late claims program.
These claims will be transferred to the category "D" Panels of Commissioners for review.
The Panel also determined that twenty-three category "D" claims, ineligible for inclusion
in the late claims program, totaled $197,694,763.60.
I. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) was established in 1981 through the
Algiers Declarations as part of the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis. The Tribunal
adjudicates disputes between Iran and the United States and their respective nationals. It
hears two categories of claims: private claims, which are claims brought by a national of
one country against the other country, and inter-governmental claims, which are claims
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brought by one country against the other, alleging either a breach of contract or a violation
of the Algiers Declarations.70 After nearly two decades in operation, the Tribunal has heard
virtually all of the private claims, disposing of nearly 4000 cases, and awarding more than
$2.5 billion to the United States and its nationals and more than $900 million to Iran and
Iranian nationals. Its docket now consists primarily of large inter-governmental claims.
The Tribunal's Chamber One decided the final private case, Frederica Lincoln Riaba and
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in February 2003.71 Riahi sought more than
$33 million in compensation, claiming that Iran expropriated various real property, personal
property, and shareholdings and debt interests in a number of companies.
Riahi, the American-born wife of an Iranian man, is of dual nationality. According to
Tribunal precedent, claimants who are dual American-Iranian nationals must prove that
they are dominant and effective American nationals for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction
over their claims. In an earlier interlocutory award, Chamber One determined that Riahi's
dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States. The Tribunal's dual-
nationality precedents also recognize a caveat, which states that when the Tribunal "finds
jurisdiction based upon a dominant and effective nationality of the claimant, the other
nationality may remain relevant to the merits of the claim."" Chamber One noted the
potential relevance of the caveat in its interim decision in Riahi, and in its final decision,
the Chamber concluded that the caveat barred Riahi from recovering for her expropriated
interest in an apartment building and for her expropriated contractual rights to purchase
two other apartment buildings. The Chamber concluded, "the right to acquire real property
in Iran by contract, apart from certain limited exceptions not relevant here is a benefit
reserved for Iranian nationals."73 The Chamber determined that Riahi had acquired her
interest in the apartment building by use of her Iranian nationality, and because she did,
the Chamber went on to conclude that the caveat prevents her from invoking her American
nationality before the Tribunal to recover compensation.
The Chamber rejected seven amendments to Riahi's Statement of Claim that had sought
more than $1.1 million in compensation, finding that they constituted new claims filed after
the jurisdictional cut-off date. With respect to the expropriated companies, the Chamber
determined that Riahi failed to prove that she owned the vast bulk of the shares that she
claimed to own. To determine the appropriate compensation for the properties that the
Tribunal determined Riahi did own, the Chamber considered several valuation reports that
the parties submitted, but generally made its own equitable approximations of the value of
the various companies based on the evidence appearing in the record. In sum, the Chamber
awarded Riahi $1,673,151 plus approximately seven percent per annum simple interest and
$70,000 for her partial costs of arbitration.
70. The term Algiers Declarations refers to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration), Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 3, and the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement
of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration or CSD), Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 9.
71. Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No.
ITL 80-485-1 (June 10, 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-U.S.C.T. R. 176.
72. Iran and United States, Case No. A18, Decision No. DEC 32-A18-FT (Apr. 6, 1984), reprinted in 5
Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 251, 265-66.
73. Riabi v. Iran, Iran Final Award No. 600-485-1 (Feb. 27, 2003) para. 281.
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In April 2003, Riahi filed an application before the Full Tribunal asking them to re-open
the Award and to transfer the case either to the Full Tribunal or jointly to Chambers Two
and Three for reconsideration. Relying heavily on a dissenting opinion of Chamber One's
American member, Charles Brower, Riahi maintained that such reconsideration was justi-
fied because the Award "manifestly fails to meet the Tribunal's standards of respect for law,
procedural fairness, and impartiality."74 The President of the Tribunal informed Riahi, by
letter, that the Full Tribunal was without jurisdiction to consider the application, stating
that any jurisdiction that remains after a Chamber has rendered a final and binding award
remains in that Chamber. Riahi proceeded to file her application for reconsideration with
Chamber One and included in that application a request that the Chairman of Chamber
One, Bengt Broms, recuse himself. The application and the recusal request are currently
pending.
The Tribunal held two hearings in inter-governmental cases during the Fall of 2003. In
the United States' counterclaim in Case No. B1, the United States asserted that Iran
breached confidentiality provisions appearing in certain contracts for the sale of military
parts. Iran maintained, inter alia, that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over counter-
claims in inter-government cases involving contracts for the purchase or sale of goods or
services.7" The Tribunal's hearing in Case No. B 1 addressed that question of jurisdiction.
The second hearing, Case No. A33, concerned Iran's performance of its obligation to
replenish the Tribunal's Security Account. Paragraph 7 of the General Declaration estab-
lished a $1 billion Security Account to pay claims against Iran, and the paragraph requires
Iran to replenish the Security Account when the balance in the account falls below $500
million. Iran stopped replenishing the Security Account in 1992, and the United States
thereafter filed a claim, asking the Tribunal, inter alia, to order Iran to replenish. In Case
No. A28, decided in December 2000, the Tribunal determined that Iran had been in non-
compliance with its Paragraph 7 obligations since 1992, but it determined that there was
no need to order Iran to replenish the account, stating that the Tribunal expects both parties
to comply with their obligations. The Tribunal cannot assume that Iran will remain in non-
compliance in the future. Iran has remained in non-compliance since December 2000,
however, so the United States filed another claim, Case No. A33, again asking the Tribunal
to order Iran to replenish the account and asking the Tribunal to suspend work on Iran's
cases before the Tribunal until Iran meets its replenishment obligations. Awards in these
cases are expected in 2004.
IV. Claims Resolution Tribunal
On February 5, 2001, a claims process was established to provide Nazi victims or their
heirs with an opportunity to make claims to assets deposited in Swiss banks in the period
before and during World War II. This process grew out of the settlement of the Holocaust
Victim Assets class action litigation (Settlement), brought in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Court) against certain Swiss banks.7 6 Under the Set-
74. Riabi v. Iran, Application to the Full Tribunal For Relief, Case No. 485 (Apr. 7, 2003) para. 3.
75. Jurisdiction over such cases is delineated in article II, paragraph 2, of the CSD.
76. The suits alleged that the Swiss banks collaborated with and aided the Nazi regime by knowingly re-
taining and concealing assets of Holocaust victims and by accepting and laundering illegally obtained Nazi loot
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lement, the Swiss banks agreed to pay SI.25 billion, in exchange for the release of the
Swiss banks and the Swiss government from, among other things, all claims relating to the
Holocaust, World War II, its prelude, and its aftermath. The Settlement was amended later
to establish a process to provide compensation for claims concerning World War II-era
insurance policies issued to victims or targets of Nazi persecution by certain Swiss insurance
companies. The Claims Resolution Tribunal, originally established in 1997 to resolve claims
to dormant Swiss bank accounts (CRT I),7 7 was designated as the forum for the adminis-
tration of the claims process for claims to deposited assets and to insurance policies (CRT
I). 78 Of the settlement amount, $800 million was set aside for awards to claimants for the
deposited assets in Swiss banks. An additional $50 million fund was set aside for the settle-
ment of insurance claims.
79
A number of claims filed with CRT II involve German account owners whose Swiss bank
accounts were closed between 1933 and 1936. Under the Rules Governing the Claims
Resolution Process, CRT II presumes in such cases, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that neither the account owners nor the heirs received the proceeds of the claimed
account, if, among other circumstances, the account was closed after the date of occupation
of the country of residence of the account owner and before 1945 (or the year in which the
freeze of accounts from the country of residence of the account owner was lifted, whichever
is later). CRT II delayed ruling on these claims pending the results of a study that analyzed
German conduct during these early years of Nazi rule towards owners of foreign capital
and the Swiss banks' response to such conduct. The report, released in March 2002, found
that Nazi expropriation of the Swiss bank accounts of targets of Nazi persecution began as
early as 1933. 80 The report further found that Swiss banking practices enabled the expro-
priations to occur. Based on the results, the Court, in April 2003, approved an amendment
and profits of slave labor. The Settlement was for the claims of five represented classes: the deposited asset
class; the looted asset class; the refugee class; and two slave labor classes. See Claims Resolution Tribunal,
Overview, available at http://www.crt-ii.org (last visited May 16, 2004); see also Holocaust Victim Assets Liti-
gation, available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com (last visited May 16, 2004). The U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York approved the Settlement in the summer of 2000. See In re Holocaust Victim
Asset Litigation, 105 F. Supp.2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Several organizations are responsible for disbursing the
funds for the four other classes of victims. For more information on these organizations and their work, see
The Conference onjewish Material Claims Against Germany, available at http://www.claimscon.org(lastvisited
May 16, 2004); The International Organization for Migration, available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com.
In addition, there are various organizations disbursing funds for victims of the Holocaust outside the Settlement.
Information on those programs can be found at the web sites noted above. See also The International Com-
mission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, available at http://www.icheic.org (last visited May 16,2004); The
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the U.S., available at http:J/www.pcha.gov (last
visited May 16, 2004); Austrian Bank Holocaust Settlement, available at http://www.austrianbankclaims.com
(last visited May 16, 2004).
77. CRT I completed its review of claims to dormant Swiss accounts on September 30, 2001. For a review
of the awards, see Daryl A. Mundis & Mark B. Rees, International Court and Tribunals, 36 INr'L LAw 549, 564
(2002).
78. For a review of CRT II claims procedure, see Mundis & Rees, supra note 77, at 565-67.
79. One-half of the U.S. $50 million is funded from the Settlement and one-half from participating com-
panies. A complete list of participating companies is provided on the CRT's web site: http://www.crt-ii.org.
80. Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World War, Switzerland, National Socialism
and the Second World War: Final Report (2002). See Rules Governing the Claims Resolution Process, at App. C,
available at http://www.crt-ii.or/governing-.rules.phun (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
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to the Rules to define the "date of occupation" with respect to account owners in Germany
as January 30, 1933 (the date of Hitler's accession as Chancellor).
As of January 15, 2004, approximately 33,496 deposited assets claims were filed, with
12,000 found to match a published account holder."' Of those claims, CRT H has certified
and the Court has approved 1,105 awards totalling $133 million.
81. In addition, the Court decided to treat the 560,000 Initial Questionnaires returned by potential claimants
during the class action notification process as deposited assets claims. The Initial Questionnaires are being
analyzed to identify those that can be processed as CRT H claims forms.
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